Numbers 35:9-34

The -Cities of Refuge,"and the Law relating to homicide

In Numbers 35:9 the appointment of the six cities and their purpose are prescribed; Numbers 35:16 contain specimen cases distinguishing deliberate murder from accidental homicide; Numbers 35:24 provide the legal procedure; Numbers 35:29 form a conclusion.

The section presents the latest development in the O.T. of the Law of Asylum. In early days (Exodus 21:13 f. E) an appointed place was provided, to which the manslayer might flee, i.e. an altar, which would be within easy reach of every town; cf. 1 Kings 1:50; 1 Kings 2:28. In D (Deuteronomy 19:1-10), when only one altar was permitted, at the national sanctuary at Jerusalem, which would be practically useless for purposes of asylum, special cities were substituted for the local altars. Three cities were specified, and, if Jehovah enlarged the Israelites" borders, three more were to be added1 [Note: Three have previously been mentioned in Deuteronomy 4:41-43; but it is unlikely that the writer of Deuteronomy 19. understood nine cities to be intended. See Driver, Deut. p. 233.]. If the manslayer be guilty of deliberate murder, the elders of his own city shall send to the city whither he has fled for asylum, and shall deliver him up to the gô"çlor -avenger of blood"; but if the homicide was accidental, he may stay in safety in the city whither he has fled. In the present passage (P) the regulations are fuller. Of the six cities three are to be on each side of the Jordan (the fulfilment of the command, with the name of the cities, is related in Joshua 20). They receive, for the first time, the title -cities of refuge" (see on Numbers 35:11). When a manslayer flees to one of these cities, -the congregation" (see on Numbers 35:12) judges between him and the gô"çl, to discover whether the manslaughter had been deliberate or accidental. If it is proved to be accidental, the man must be taken back to the city of refuge, where he must remain until the death of the high priest. If he ventures out before that time, the gô"çlmay kill him. If, on the other hand, he is found guilty of deliberate murder, the gô"çl mustkill him.

Gray (Numb. p. 471) points out that this modifies the ancient custom in three respects: (1) Ancient custom made no distinction between accidental and deliberate manslaughter; the gô"çlmust see that the loss of life suffered by one family is compensated for. (2) In ancient custom the loss could be compensated for by the death of anymember of the manslayer's family. Here the law tacitly insists that the murderer only is to forfeit his life. (3) The present law forbids the forfeited life of the murderer to be redeemed by a money payment. Such redemption was widely prevalent, but except in certain cases not wilful murder (cf. Exodus 21:29 f.) it seems to have been prohibited at an early period in Israel, though the present law contains the earliest explicit prohibition. At the same time, the law had not yet reached its final stage of development, in that it still bade the representative of the family, and not the representative of the whole community, perform the judicial act of killing the murderer.