Romans 1:20

He did so by His works in nature. By the term τὰ ἀόρατα, the invisible things, the apostle designates the essence of God, and the manifold attributes which distinguish it. He sums them up afterwards in these two: eternal power and dwinity. Power is that which immediately arrests man, when the spectacle of nature presents itself to his view. In virtue of the principle of causality innate in his understanding, he forth with sees in this immense effect the revelation of a great cause; and the Almighty is revealed to him. But this power appears to his heart clothed with certain moral characteristics, and in particular, wisdom and goodness. He recognizes in the works of this power, in the infinite series of means and ends which are revealed in them, the undeniable traces of benevolence and intelligence; and in virtue of the principle of finality, or the notion of end, not less essentially inherent in his mind, he invests the supreme cause with the moral attributes which constitute what Paul here calls divinity, θειότης, the sum total of qualities in virtue of which the creative power can have organized such a world.

The epithet ἀΐδιος, eternal (from ἀεί, always), is joined by some with both substantives; but power alone needed to be so defined, in order to contrast it with that host of second causes which are observed in nature. The latter are the result of anterior causes. But the first cause, on which this whole series of causes and effects depends, is eternal, that is to say, self-causing. The adjective is therefore to be joined only with the first of the two substantives; the second required no such qualification. These invisible things, belonging to the essence of God, have been made visible, since by the creation of the universe they have been externally manifested. Τοῖς ποιήμασι is the dative of instrument: by the works of God in nature; ἀπό, since, indicates that the time of creation was the point of departure for this revelation which lasts still. The complex phrase νοούμενα καθορᾶται, are spiritually contemplated, contains two intimately connected ideas: on the one hand, a viewing with the outward sense; on the other, an act of intellectual perception, whereby that which presents itself to the eye becomes at the same time a revelation to our consciousness. The animal sees as man does; but it lacks the νοῦς, understanding (whence the verb νοεῖν, νοούμενα), whereby man ascends from the contemplation of the work to that of the worker. These two simultaneous sights, the one sensible, the other rational, constitute in man a single act, admirably characterized by the expression spiritual contemplation, used by the apostle.

We have here a proof of Paul's breadth of mind and heart. He does not disparage, as the Jews did, and as Christian science has sometimes done, the value of what has been called natural theology. And it is certainly not without reason that Baur (Paulus, II. p. 260) has regarded this passage as laying the first basis of the apostle's universalism. This same idea of a universal revelation appears again in Paul's discourses at Lystra and Athens (Acts 14:17; Acts 17:27-28); so also in 1 Corinthians 1:21, and in our own Epistle Romans 3:29: “Is God not also the God of the Gentiles?” a question which finds its full explanation in the idea of a primordial revelation addressed to all men.

The last words of the verse point out the aim of this universal revelation: that they may be without excuse. The words are startling: Could God have revealed Himself to the Gentiles only to have a reason for the condemnation with which He visits them? This idea has seemed so revolting, that it has been thought necessary to soften the sense of the phrase εἰς τὸ...and to translate so that (Osterv.), or: “they are therefore inexcusable” (Oltram.). It is one great merit of Meyer's commentaries that he has vigorously withstood this method of explanation, which arbitrarily weakens the meaning of certain prepositions and particles used by Paul. Had he wished to say so that, he had at command the regular expression ὥστε/ εἶναι. And the truth, if his thought is rightly understood, has nothing so very repulsive about it: in order that, he means, if after having been thus enlightened, they should fall into error as to God's existence and character, they may be without excuse. The first aim of the Creator was to make Himself known to His creature. But if, through his own fault, man came to turn away from this light, he should not be able to accuse God of the darkness into which he had plunged himself. One might translate somewhat coarsely: that in case of going astray, they might not be able to plead ignorance as a pretext. In these circumstances there is nothing to prevent the in order that from preserving its natural meaning.