Matthew 21:29-31

Matthew 21:29-31 ouv qe,lw( u[steron de. metamelhqei.j avph/lqen … e`te,rw| … evgw,( ku,rie\ kai. ouvk avph/lqen … o` prw/toj {C}

The textual transmission of the parable of the two sons is very much confused (see also the comment on 21.32). Is the recusant but subsequently obedient son mentioned first or second (ver. Matthew 21:29)? Which of the two sons did the Jews intend to assert had done the father’s bidding (ver. Matthew 21:31), and what word did they use in their reply to Jesus’ question (prw/toj or e;scatoj or u[steroj or deu,teroj)? There are three principal forms of text.

(a) According to a C* K W D P it^{c, q} vg syr^{c, p, h} al, the first son says “No” but afterwards repents. The second son says “Yes” but does nothing. Which one did the will of the father? Answer: o` prw/toj.

(b) According to D it^{a, b, d, e, ff2, h, l} syr^s al, the first son says “No” but afterwards repents. The second son says “Yes” but does nothing. Which one did the will of the father? Answer: o` e;scatoj.

(c) According to B Q ¦¹³ 700 syr^pal arm geo al, the first son says “Yes” but does nothing. The second says “No” but afterwards repents. Which one did the will of the father? Answer: o` u[steroj (B), or o` e;scatoj (Q ¦¹³ 700 arm), or o` deu,teroj (4 273), or o` prw/toj (geo^A).

Because (b) is the most difficult of the three forms of text, several scholars (Lachmann, Merx, Wellhausen, Hirsch) have thought that it must be preferred as readily accounting for the rise of the other two as improvements of it. But (b) is not only difficult, it is nonsensical — the son who said “Yes” but does nothing obeys his father’s will! Jerome, who knew of manuscripts in his day that read the nonsensical answer, suggested that through perversity the Jews intentionally gave an absurd reply in order to spoil the point of the parable. But this explanation requires the further supposition that the Jews not only recognized that the parable was directed against themselves but chose to make a nonsensical reply rather than merely remain silent. Because such explanations attribute to the Jews, or to Matthew, farfetched psychological or overly-subtle literary motives, the Committee judged that the origin of reading (b) is due to copyists who either committed a transcriptional blunder or who were motivated by anti-Pharisaic bias (i.e., since Jesus had characterized the Pharisees as those that say but do not practice (cf. Matthew 23:3), they must be represented as approving the son who said “I go,” but did not go).

As between forms (a) and (c) the former is more probably the original. Not only are the witnesses that support (a) slightly better than those that read (c), but there would be a natural tendency to transpose the order of (a) to that of (c) because:

(1) it could be argued that if the first son obeyed, there was no reason to summon the second; and

(2) it was natural to identify the disobedient son with either the Jews in general or with the chief priests and elders (ver. Matthew 21:23) and the obedient son with either the Gentiles or the tax collectors and the prostitutes (ver. Matthew 21:31) — and in accord with either line of interpretation, the obedient son should come last in chronological sequence. It may also be remarked that the inferiority of form (c) is shown by the wide diversity of readings at the close of the parable. ²⁵

²⁵ For other discussions of this perplexing passage see Josef Schmid (who concludes that form (c) is original), “Das textgeschichtliche Problem der Parabel von den zwei Söhnen,” in Vom Wort des Lebens, Festschrift für Max Meinertz, ed. Nikolaus Adler (= Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen; 1. Ergänzungsband; Münster/Westf., 1951), pp. 68—84, and J. Ramsey Michaels (who argues that forms (a) and (c) were derived from (b)), “The Parable of the Regretful Son,” Harvard Theological Review, LXI (1968), pp. 15—26.