1 Corinthians 13:2

Though I have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. Erasmus thinks that this is a hyperbolic fiction, as though he should say, "Charity by far excels faith," just as we say, "Virtue alone is the only nobility." But this is far too cold; for in the following verse, speaking of almsgiving and martyrdom if charity is wanting, he says, it profiteth me nothing. Therefore, I am nothing imports I am of no value, and have no grace in the presence of God; and in truth, because the righteous man is of some account before God, the rest of men, being unrighteous, are, in the eyes and estimation of God, as nothing. In other words, without charity nothing profiteth, nothing makes friendship with God; there is nothing which wins for a man righteousness and salvation, not even faith, though it be most great and most excellent, so that it can remove mountains, such as Gregory Thaumaturgus had, who, by his faith, moved a mount from its place, that he might make a place to build a church, as Eusebius narrates (Hist. lib. 7, v. 25).

You will say, therefore, If a penitent exercises himself in good works before reconciliation, they profit him nothing. Some answer that they profit him, because the penitent, they say, has charity not infused charity which makes righteous, but that charity which is a sincere love towards God, by which he longs for reconciliation. But this affection is not and cannot be called charity; for Holy Scripture, here and elsewhere, calls charity that most eminent virtue, greater than faith and hope, which makes us friends of God.

Secondly, because the affections of fear, hope, and faith dispose to righteousness, therefore they are something, even without the affection of that love. I reply, Good works profit the sinner who repents nothing, unless charity follow. For so, he says, alms giving profits nothing, as will appear in ver. 3. For disposition by itself is useless and of no account unless there follow the form to which it disposes; therefore works without charity are nothing, that is, they confer no righteousness or salvation; and a man without charity is nothing so far as the spiritual being is concerned, in which, by supernatural regeneration, he receives a supernatural and Divine being, and is made a new creature of God, a son and heir of God. Hence it follows that faith alone does not justify.

Beza replies that here faith which works miracles alone is in question; for justifying faith, which lays hold of the mercy of God in Christ, can be separated from charity indeed in thought, but not in reality, any more than light from fire. But on the other hand, since faith which works miracles includes and presupposes faith properly so called, which is the beginning of justification (nay, faith which works miracles is the most excellent faith, as the Apostle here signifies when he says: "Though I have faith so that I could remove mountains"), therefore, if faith which works miracles can exist without charity, it will also be able to be justifying faith. Secondly, the Apostle says "all faith," which Beza dishonestly translates "whole faith:" if all, therefore also justifying.

Thirdly, the Apostle teaches us (vers. 3 and 13) that faith and hope, both theological and justifying, remain in this life only, while charity remains also in the future life; therefore faith is separated from charity. So Chrysostom, Anselm, Theophylact, and others; and especially S. Augustine (de Trin. lib. xv. c. 18) says: "Faith, according to the Apostle, can be without charity; it cannot be profitable;" and in his sermon on the three virtues faith, hope, and charity (tom. x.), he speaks of charity alone, "that it distinguishes between the children of God and the children of the devil, between the children of the Kingdom and the children of perdition;" and again (Lib,. de Naturâ et Gratiâ, c. ult.) he says: "Charity begun is righteousness begun; charity increased is righteousness increased; charity perfected is righteousness perfected." See Bellarmine (de Justificatione. lib. i. c. 15). What faith which works miracles is I have said (chap. xii. 9); why the operation of miracles is to be attributed to faith S. Thomas teaches (de Potentiâ, qu. 6, art. 9). Ver. 3 And though I bestow all my goods. The Greek verb signifies to put into the mouths of children or the sick bread, or food, in crumbs as cut up, as I have said (Rom 12:20); here, however, it denotes to expend all one's substance for such a purpose.

Though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it pofiteth me nothing. You will say, Martyrdom, then, can be without grace and charity, with sin and damnation. Note firstly, as one can give alms, so one can hand over one's body in different ways and from different motives, e.g., for one's country, for one's neighbour, for correction of the body, from vain glory, or again for the faith, for the love of Christ and of God and then it is martyrdom. Secondly, martyrdom is an act springing from the virtue of fortitude, ordered often by charity; still it can be ordered, not by charity, but by another virtue, as by religion or obedience; e.g., if a man offer himself to martyrdom, that he may honour God or obey Him. These actions, however, flow from a general love of God. Thirdly, martyrdom, from whatever virtue springing, confers justifying grace, even the first, from the mere fact of its being wrought, as theologians teach; and consequently it confers charity, nor can it be separated from it as from its end.

I say, then, firstly, that the Apostle speaks in general terms of any handing over of the body to be burned: Whether any one does it for his country, as Mucius Scævola did, who, wishing to kill King Porsena when he was besieging Rome, made a mistake, and fell into the power of his enemies; then, to show how little he shrank from death for his country, he burnt his hand, "In order that you may know," he said to Porsena, "how vile is the body in the eyes of us who look for glory;" or whether he do it for empty fame, as Peregrinus did, who, to obtain for himself an immortal name, threw himself at the Olympic games on a pyre to be consumed, as Lucian, an eyewitness, testified; or whether any one commit himself to fire for the faith of Christ, while at the same time keeping hatred of his neighbour, or a desire to commit mortal sin: which martyrdom is material, not formal; for it is then without charity and profiteth nothing, as D. Thomas, Anselm, and Theodoret say.

Hence, I say secondly, that the Apostle also speaks of giving the body in material and formal martyrdom, but hypothetically, i.e., if martyrdom could be without charity it would profit nothing. So S. Chrysostom and Theophylact. Whence Theodoret and S. Basil (Epis. 75 ad Neocæsarienses) remark that there is here a hyperbole. But, if you wish, the Apostle speaks, not merely hypothetically, but absolutely.

I say thirdly, martyrdom antecedently, whether from the mere fact of being wrought, in so far as its work is regarded in itself, or in so far as the merit of him who suffers martyrdom is regarded, can be without charity, e.g., if one living in mortal sin is willing to die for the faith of Christ, when as yet he has not charity, martyrdom profits him nothing. Nevertheless, in consequence, from the mere fact of its being wrought, in his end martyrdom always brings charity; for, from the very fact that any one, even a sinner, is killed for the faith, charity and righteousness are infused into him as if from the very act itself, and in this way martyrdom eminently profits. In this way, therefore, the sense of the Apostle will be, Martyrdom profiteth nothing unless charity go before, follow after, or accompany it, whether as the source or the end and effect of martyrdom. So S. Thomas, Cajetan, and Francisco Suarez (p. 3, qu. 69, disp. 29, sec 2). Anselm says: "Without charity nothing profits, however excellent; with charity everything profits, however vile, and becomes golden and Divine."

It profiteth me nothing. I am not helped, I receive no benefit, i.e., towards justification and salvation. So Ephrem., "So great is charity that, if it be wanting, other things are reckoned vain; if it be present, we possess all," says S. Augustine (tom. iii. Sententia, 326).