Tito 1:8

ἀλλὰ φιλόξενον. We now come to the positive qualifications, the first-named of which, φιλοξενία, stands in sharp contrast to αἰσχροκέρδεια. see on 1 Timoteo 3:2.

φιλάγαθον, a lover of good; whether ‘of good things’ or ‘of good persons’ is not clear, but probably it ought to be taken in its widest meaning, as including both. See note on ἀφιλάγαθοι, 2 Timoteo 3:3.

σώφρονα. see on 1 Timoteo 2:9; 1 Timoteo 3:2.

δίκαιον, ὅσιον. These important qualifications are not mentioned in the corresponding list in 1 Timoteo 3. From Plato onward δικαιοσύνη and ὁσιότης were counted as complementary to each other, the former being expressive (in its largest sense) of duty to our fellow men, the latter of duty to God, the two together including the sum of moral excellence.

But anything like a sharp division between them, as if a man could discharge his duty to his neighbour in all its fulness, while neglecting his duty to God, or vice versâ, would be utterly foreign to the central thought of Christianity, which refuses thus to divorce the religious from the secular life. For the association of the two words or their cognates, as here, cp. Lucas 1:75; Efesios 4:24; 1 Tesalonicenses 2:10.

ἐγκρατῆ, continent, and generally, one who is master of himself. The distinction between the σώφρων and the ἐγκρατής, as presented in the Ethics of Aristotle, was that while the ἐγκρατής is able to endure pain which ought to be endured, the σώφρων is able as well to resist unlawful pleasure, a harder task. The distinction is between him who endures, and him who overcomes, for conscience’ sake.

The σώφρων is moderate in the enjoyment of what is lawful; the ἐγκρατής refrains from what is unlawful. The word ἐγκρατής does not occur again in the N.T., but cp. 1 Corintios 7:9; Gálatas 5:23 for ἐγκρατεύεσθαι and ἐγκράτεια.